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14 May 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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14 MAY 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR--Nasir claims USSR ready to deliver MIG-19 jet fighter aircraft immediately.

Communist capability to disrupt internal security in Laos increasing; widespread guerrilla action could be initiated at any time.

Cambodian leader's international outlook altered by Chou En-lai's public pledges of support; may be more inflexible in disputes with neighbors.

South Korean National Assembly moves to vote new constitutional amendment on governmental changes in about 30 days.

Indian Communist party in recent meeting fails to resolve controversy over party policy.

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III. THE WEST

⑥ Cuban allegations of US violation of territorial waters may lead to further anti-US demonstrations.

LATE ITEM

⑦ Comment on workers' protest meetings being held throughout USSR.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 May 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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UAR-USSR: [Nasir stated on 12 May that the USSR has informed him it is ready to make immediate delivery of the MIG-19 fighter aircraft requested by the UAR, [redacted]

NO

[redacted] Cairo expected to receive 15 MIG-19's in September and was attempting to persuade Moscow to increase this number. [redacted]

OK - delete 1st half of 2nd sent. of 1st P. add modify 2nd half accordingly

Laos: The consensus of Western missions in Vientiane is that the Communist ability to disrupt internal security in Laos is increasing steadily despite the relatively calm situation prevailing since last summer. While the effectiveness of the Laotian Army has been increased through improved training and better equipment, it appears that the number and strength of Communist supporters have likewise grown. The American mission in Vientiane estimates that the Pathet Lao has the capability to launch widespread guerrilla action at any time. [redacted]

[redacted] an approved Pathet Lao plan for launching large-scale guerrilla activity at an unspecified date. [redacted]

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OK Cambodia: US Ambassador Trimble views Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Cambodia earlier this month as having a profound impact on Cambodia's international outlook. He feels that Cambodian leader Sihanouk, in effect, regards Chou's public pledges of Communist China's support for Cambodia, which Chou was careful to describe as "moral and political," as a guarantee of Cambodian national integrity, and accordingly will be more inflexible than ever in disputes with South Vietnam and Thailand. Continued efforts by these two countries to undermine Sihanouk may well influence Cambodia to abandon its policy of strict neutrality. [redacted]

(Page 2)

NO South Korea: The National Assembly is moving to vote in about 30 days on a constitutional amendment to reduce the powers of the president and establish a cabinet with a prime minister responsible to the legislature. Resignations by assembly members of the majority Liberal party, however, could block passage of the amendment. (Acting Chief of State Huh Chung, while making sweeping shifts in government personnel, is attempting to minimize the disruption of government functions. Popular pressure for faster and more extensive changes, however, could seriously impair effective government operations.) [redacted] (Page 3)

OK India: The Indian Communist party has postponed a showdown between its "moderate" leaders and hard-line extremists until a party congress is held in January 1961. The Communists' national council, having failed during its meeting from 6 to 12 May to resolve the bitter controversy over future party policy, appointed a balanced committee to formulate another draft program. [The radical "leftist" faction, encouraged by Peiping's hard-line Red Flag articles, has gained some ground recently but the "moderates," reflecting Moscow's views, have retained control. The party outwardly has closed ranks since last fall's open split on the Sino-Indian border dispute, but deep differences remain, especially over the degree of support to be given generally to Nehru.] [redacted] (Page 5)

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DAILY BRIEF

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III. THE WEST

NO Cuba: The Castro government has urgently demanded an explanation of the presence on 11 May of a US destroyer in waters alleged to be Cuban. [redacted]

[redacted] alleged violations of territorial waters by US surface ships and submarines may be the basis for claims of impending invasion published in the Castro-controlled press on 11 May. The publication of the latest charges, coupled with resentment already aroused by press accusations and by the illegal flight to Cuba of an American pilot, may lead to further anti-US demonstrations. [redacted] (Page 6)

LATE ITEM

NO *USSR: The US Embassy in Moscow considers that the public campaign in the USSR concerning the U-2 Plane incident has been "stepped up one notch." The keynote of the workers' protest meetings, now widely organized throughout the USSR, is the condemnation of the concept that there could be justification of US efforts to penetrate the "iron curtain" in the interests of the people. This program to create an "outraged" Soviet public appears designed to strengthen Khrushchev's hand in Paris against any Western efforts in summit negotiations to breach the basic assets of bloc secrecy. [redacted]
[redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Communist Strength in Laos Increasing

The British, French, and American embassies in Vientiane believe Communist strength in Laos is steadily increasing and the security situation deteriorating despite the relative calm of the past nine months. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] an approved plan for future large-scale guerrilla activity combined with a major propaganda campaign, and the consensus of the American mission in Laos is that the Pathet Lao has the capability to launch such an attack at any time.] [REDACTED]

Pathet Lao strength has been built up through a combination of terrorism, propaganda, and promises and is greatest in the areas near the North Vietnamese border. It has gained followers from the Santiphab party, and, through its legal instrument, the Neo Lao Hak Sat, it has sympathizers throughout the country. It now is believed that, through improvements in organization, command, and communication [REDACTED] all major Pathet Lao units can be contacted from headquarters within 48 hours and villages and rural areas throughout the country within five days.

The Laotian Army has increased its effectiveness during the same period and army leaders assert it now can contain any outbreak of insurgency so long as it is not accompanied by appreciable foreign assistance. The army's size has increased, and its training, equipment, and deployment is markedly improved. However, it still has the major defect of inadequate reserve units.

So far, despite their ability to launch an all-out campaign, the Pathet Lao forces have contented themselves with hit-and-run terrorism. It appears that, unless provoked by government action, they will attempt by their present tactics to gain a cease-fire, negotiations, and political concessions from the government. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Cambodian Internal Outlook Following Chou En-lai Visit

The visit to Cambodia by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai from 5 to 9 May, coming at a time of serious Cambodian - South Vietnamese friction, may have a far-reaching effect on Cambodia's international outlook, in the opinion of American Ambassador Trimble. While it made relatively little impact on the general public, except for the enthusiastic Overseas Chinese community, Chou made a deep and favorable impression on Cambodian leader Sihanouk, the royal family, and Cambodian officialdom.

The Chinese leader, who came to Cambodia to deepen Sihanouk's preference for a neutral foreign policy and to counterbalance American influence there, apparently was determined to achieve a maximum impact without making any formal commitment to protect Cambodia's borders. Chou En-lai on 8 May made no commitment beyond stating that it was "moral and political" support China was offering and cautiously added that any "other" kind would depend on the needs of Cambodia, the possibilities at Peiping's disposal, and conditions prevailing at the time.

Despite the innocuous joint communiqué ending the visit, Sihanouk probably looks upon Chou's oft-repeated public pledges of Communist China's support for Cambodia as a guarantee of Cambodian national integrity. Sihanouk, in his personal press organ, The Nationalist, commented on 7 May that the Cambodian people are convinced that Cambodia's escape from the "murder prepared by its neighbors" is due to the attitude of Communist China.

Sihanouk probably intends to use the threat of Chinese Communist support in disputes with South Vietnam and Thailand, and will be more inflexible than ever. In connection with current difficulties with South Vietnam over several offshore islands in the Gulf of Siam, Sihanouk's hand has been strengthened by Chou's tour of the area in a Cambodian gunboat and his flat statement that they belong to Cambodia.

Whether Sihanouk abandons his policy of strict neutrality will depend largely on future South Vietnamese and Thai policy toward Cambodia. He has repeatedly warned that continued efforts by these countries to undermine him could push him "into the arms of the Chinese Communists."

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South Korean Situation

The South Korean National Assembly is to vote in about 30 days on a constitutional amendment to reduce the powers of the president, establish a cabinet with a prime minister responsible to the legislature, and make the judiciary independent. Members of the majority Liberal party, however, are threatening to resign from the legislature unless "illegal" retaliations against local party leaders are halted. This could prevent passage of the measure until a new assembly is elected. Assembly elections now are scheduled 45 days after the amendment is passed.

Meanwhile, Acting Chief of State Huh Chung, while making sweeping shifts in government personnel, [is attempting to minimize the disruption of government functions. He] has warned that a clear distinction should be made between those in high places who planned the rigging of the 15 March presidential elections and those who were forced to take part in the irregularities. [His policy, in general, apparently has been to decline to accept the resignation of an official until a replacement is found.]

Popular pressures for faster and more extensive changes, however, could seriously impair effective government operations. The authorities reportedly have broadened their investigation of the 15 March elections to include subordinates as well as principals. Huh on 11 May accepted the resignation of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Cho Yong-sun after resisting his ouster on the grounds that it would create a vacuum in the operation of the judiciary during an emergency.

[redacted] an extensive police reshuffle is under way down through the level of lieutenant. [redacted]

New Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Yi Chong-chan announced on 9 May that all military commanders, including the chiefs of the three services, would be punished if they were found to have been involved in election irregularities. Yi reportedly

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[is convinced that Army Chief of Staff and martial law commander Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan is in large measure responsible for the involvement of the army, although Yi is willing to withhold disciplinary action until the present political situation is more settled.]

should Yi's announcement trigger a wave of resignations and retirements of able senior officers, South Korea's defensive posture would be damaged.

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Indian Communists Fail to Resolve Party Split

Indian Communist leaders have again failed to resolve the deep division in their party between proponents of a moderate line and those favoring more radical tactics. The showdown expected during the national council's meeting from 6 to 12 May in Calcutta now has been put off until a full-scale party congress is held in January 1961. The council, recognizing its inability to reconcile the differences, has appointed a committee, representing both the moderates and the hard-line extremists, to "study" the problem further and formulate another draft resolution for discussion in January. The party meanwhile is to be guided by the moderate "Amritsar thesis" adopted in 1958, which emphasized a peaceful, parliamentary approach to power.

[Several executive meetings held since the party's setbacks resulting from the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Communist electoral defeat in Kerala State have ended in a deadlock over future party policy. The more aggressive "leftist" faction has gained some ground in party circles recently, although the moderates so far have foiled efforts by the extremists to gain control and switch party tactics. The dispute, which began over theory, now seems to be focused on the degree of cooperation which Indian Communists should extend to Prime Minister Nehru and certain "progressive" policies of the Congress party.]

Moderate General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh has been granted sick leave for three months, and E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former chief minister of Kerala, will act as party leader during this period. Namboodiripad has long been identified with the faction favoring parliamentary tactics, although he reportedly sided with the radical group in recent intraparty maneuvering.

Ideological confusion among the Indian Communists has been compounded by recent indications of similar differences between Peiping and Moscow. Extremist leaders--representing the "internationalist" viewpoint--have seized on Peiping's Red Flag articles to bolster their advocacy of a harder line, but the moderate faction enjoys the stronger advantage of support from the Soviet party.

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III. THE WEST

New Cuban Attacks on US

The Castro government has urgently demanded from the American Embassy an explanation of the alleged intrusion by a US destroyer into Cuban territorial waters off the north coast of Matanzas Province on 11 May. A Cuban Coast Guard ship reporting the incident claimed the destroyer did not answer its attempts to establish contact. The destroyer's commander has reported that his closest approach to Cuban territory was five miles, and that there was contact with the Cuban patrol ship both by searchlight signals and by voice. Cuba's position on the width of territorial waters has fluctuated. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] alleged violations of jurisdictional waters by US surface ships and submarines, and Castro is apparently worried about the possibility of an invasion. In addition to continuous coast guard patrols, Cuban military planes are making frequent reconnaissance flights, and on 9 May Cuban Air Force planes flew over the British island of Cayo Sal, which lies between Florida and Cuba. [REDACTED]

On 10 May the Castro daily, Revolucion, headlines new charges that the United States is planning "an aggression" against Cuba. Government-controlled student and labor organizations led anti-US demonstrations on 11 and 12 May against "US invasion plans" and against supporters and publishers of two of the three newspapers the government does not yet control. Cuba's oldest and largest daily, the anti-Communist Diario de la Marina, was taken over on 11 May by unions of its workers, who accused its publisher of taking orders from the US Embassy. He has taken asylum in the Peruvian Embassy.

The illegal flight to Cuba on 12 May by an American pilot, as well as publication of the destroyer incident, may touch off even more violent anti-American demonstrations. [REDACTED]

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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